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I.

INTRODUCTION

United States foreign policy toward Cuba has to a great degree been
based on the containment and management of Cuban nationals seeking to
migrate to the Untied States. On both sides of the Florida Straits, policy
makers balance domestic political interests with foreign policy objectives,
while seeking to manage the ever-present threat of a massive migration
crisis.
From the early days of the "freedom flights,"' the Mariel boatlift, 2 the
Guantanamo Refugee, crisis, The Cuban Refugee Adjustment Refugee Act
J.D. Candidate, Class of 2003, Nova Southeastern University, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida.
1. In November of 1966, following a massive sea exodus form the port of Camarioca in
Cuba, the Johnson administration set up formal flights to bring Cubans seeking refuge to the
United States. Those flights became informally known as the freedom flights.
2. In 1980, Cuban president Fidel Castro allowed Cubans, who wanted to leave to the
United States to be picked by their relatives through the port of Mariel. It became known as the
Mariel Boat Lift.
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of 1966' (CAA) has been at the center of the vortex. This United States
law has been lauded as the proper vehicle to illustrate our "very strong
desire that Cuba shall be freed from Communist domination and that the
Cuban people will again, be able to enjoy the benefits of freedom"' and it
has been labeled as a "diabolical killing machine that claims lives and
provokes tragedy. ",
During last few years efforts to repeal the CAA have intensified both
in Cuba and in the United States. Several legislative efforts have been
made to repeal it and immigration reform groups have joined the fight to
have the CAA overturned. Refugee advocates have complained that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) interpretation of new statutes
affecting the CAA has caused a "de facto repeal of the Cuban Adjustment
and circumvented congressional intent"' and litigation over the application
of the CAA has ensued.
This comment seeks to analyze the congressional intent for passing
the CAA, the early application of the statute, its application in subsequent
migratory crisis, INS interpretation of its application and validity, and the
political battles that have ensued in an effort to repeal it.
II.

CUBAN ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1966: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
During the period of 1902-1959 the United States did not have a
separate policy to deal with Cuban migration.8 The migration of Cubans to
the United States followed an orderly process and Cuba was not seen as
migratory threat9 . On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro seized control of the
Cuban government and shortly thereafter installed a communist
dictatorship on the island. Cuban migration exploded following the Cuban
revolution, and the number of Cubans entering the United States grew
from 70,000' 0 prior to 1959 to over 1,053,000 in 1990."1
3. In 1994 Fidel Castro allowed Cubans who wanted to leave the island to do by sea.
That resulted in a large refugee exodus by Cubans using boats and rafts. The United States
Coast intercepted the refugees and detained them at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
4. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966); 8
U.S.C. § 1255 (1994 & Supp. 111966) [hereinafter Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966].
5. H.R. REP. No. 89-1978, at 4 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794.
6. President Fidel Castro Ruz, Address at the 7th Congress of Federation of Cuban
Women (Mar. 8, 2000).
7. Maria Dominguez, Cuban Adjustment Act Survives, C.A.B.A Briefs at 12 (1999).
8. Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Cuban Immigration: Challenges and Opportunities, in
CUBA INTRANSITION-AsOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN ECONOMY 65,66 (1998).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 66.
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In January of 1961, the United States severed diplomatic relations
with Cuba and launched an exile led invasion known as the "the bay of
Pigs" 12 in an effort to overthrow the Cuban government 13. In 1962, the
United States banned commercial transportation to and from Cuba.
Following the Castro revolution, political and economic conditions in Cuba
deteriorated and the numbers of Cubans seeking to migrate to the United
States increased dramatically."' These early refugees were paroled into the
United States and no interdiction and deportation efforts were made.
These early refugees received public assistance by programs set up by the
United States government for their benefit. "5
In 1965, the Cuban government allowed all those who opposed the
communist government to leave the island by sea through the port of
Camarioca and thousands fled to United States by boat, many with the aid
President Lyndon B.
of the exile community in the United States.'
Johnson was faced with the first mass exodus of Cubans to the United
States. On October 3, 1965, the President welcomed the Cubans fleeing
the island, declaring in a speech "that those seeking refuge here in7
America will find it. We Americans will welcome these Cuban people."
The United States formalized the orderly departure of Cubans from the
island by instituting the "freedom flights" on December 1, 1965.18
This migration crisis resulted in thousands of Cuban nationals being
paroled into the United States for an indefinite period of time without the
possibility of returning to their country of origin.19 Cuban refugees could
only adjust their status to permanent resident by leaving the United States
and seeking an immigrant visa at a United States consulate and returning to
the United States as permanent residents.n This process proved difficult if
not impossible for most refugees and the number of migrants paroled into
1990,
at
States
Census
Bureau
11. United
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/BasicFactsServlet (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
12. A group of Cuban American soldiers trained by the CIA invaded Cuba on April 17,
1961. The invasion took place on Bahia de Cochinos on the southern coast of Cuba. Bay of Pigs
is the English translation of Bahia de Cochinos.
13. Id.
14. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 8, at 66.
15. Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-510, 76 Stat. 121.
16. The ObanAdjustment Act of 1966: ?MirandoPor los Ojos de Don Quijote 0 Sancho
Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REV. 902, 904 (2001).
17. President Lyndon Johnson, Address to the People of Cuba (Oct. 3, 1965).
18. The Cuban Adjusment Act of 1966: ?Mirando Por los Ojos de Don Quijote 0 Sancho
Panza?, supra note 16, at 904.
19. Dominguez, supra note 7.
20. H.R. REP. No. 89-1978.
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the United States far outnumbered those able to obtain an immigrant visa.
Congress reasoned that the process in place would create "great personal
hardship to those already impoverished by force or circumstance. "21
Congress intended to create legislation which would enhance the
resettlement of Cuban refugees and to improve their opportunity to be
gainfully employed and educated in the United States." It is against this
backdrop that congress decided to expedite the adjustment of status for
Cuban refugees by implementing the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of
1966.
On November 2, 1966, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act.
The act states:
That notwithstanding the provisions of section 245(c) of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act the status of any
alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been
inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States
subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been physically
present for at least one year, may be adjusted by the
Attorney General in his discretion and under such
regulations as he may prescribe, to that of an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, if the alien makes an
application for such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to
receive an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United
States for permanent residence.3
From the unambiguous language of the statute it would appear that the
law could be easily applied to Cuban migrants as they entered the United
States in succeeding years. However, the CAA has been a source of
controversy and many attempts have been made to repeal it, restrict it or
modify it. The maxim that "the function of a court in interpreting a statute
is to determine the intent of Congress in enacting the statute and to give
effect to that intent"14 does not seem to apply to the various applications
given to the Cuban Adjustment Act.
The Cuban adjustment act was the byproduct of an era when the
United States had a "willingness to approve legislation to aid the
persecuted peoples of the world. "15Other legislation passed during that era
suggests that protective immigration laws were used as a United States
21. Id. at 3794.
22.

Id. at 3793.

23. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act, supra note 4.
24. United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310
25. H.R. REP. No 89-1978.

U.S. 534 (1940).
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policy statement against Communism. The debate over the usefulness of
the CAA took center stage after the end of the Cold War and it has now
become the pivotal issue in United States-Cuba relations.
III.

APPLICATION AND USE IN SUBSEQUENT MIGRATION CRISIS:

MARIEL-GUANTANAMO
United States-Cuba migration policy was severely tested in the spring
of 1980, when on April 19, Fidel Castro opened the port of Mariel and
allowed Cubans to migrate. Within days, relatives from the United States
flooded the Straits of Florida with vessels seeking to bring their relatives to
the United States. Between April 1 and September 25, 1980, 124,776
Cuban nationals entered the United States by sea."
The United States government welcomed these refugees. Congress
declared, "It is the historic policy of the United States to the respond to the
urgent needs of person subject to persecution in their homeland. "s The act
defined a refugee as "any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality . . .and who is unable or unwilling to return, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that
country because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution. "2
Analysis of the Acts' legislative history indicates that the statutory
language indicating the United States "would provide aid for necessary
transportation, to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern
to the United States" applies to Cubans?3 The Refugee Act of 1980
reduced the physical presence requirement for Cubans seeking adjustment
form two years to one.3' This reduction led some refugee advocates to
infer that since the same period of adjustment applies to refugees as it does
for Cubans seeking adjustment under the CAA, this signaled legislative
intent to consider Cubans defacto refugees. n
26. See Dominguez, supra note 7, (discussing Pub. L. No. 85-559 on behalf of Hungarian
Refugees; Pub. L. No. 86-648 (on behalf of refugees within the mandate of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees) and Pub. L. No. 89-236 (on behalf of refugees from communist
countries outside the Western Hemisphere)).
27.

United States Coast Guard, Mariel Boat Lift, U.S. COAST GUARD ALIEN MIGRANT

INTERDICTION, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opl/mle/mariel.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
28. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102, 8 U.S.C. § 1521 (1980)
[hereinafter Refugee Act of 1980].
29. Id.
30. Id. See also Michael W. Lind, Cuban Refugees at Sea: A Legal Twilight Zone, 24
CAP. U. L. REV. 789, 793 (1995) (discussing S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)).
31. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 28. 94 Stat. 108 (B)(i) amended the first section of
the Cuban Adjustment Act by striking out two years and inserting in lieu one year.
32. Dominguez, supra note 7.
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In 1984, the office of special council instructed INS that the Cubans
seeking adjustment under the CAA would not be dependent on the
availability of an immigrant visa and therefore the numbers of those
receiving permanent residence would not be limited by the number of visas
available. The court in Fair v. Meese33 held that nothing in the 1976
amendment to the CAA required that any applicants be charged against the
collateral quotas, regardless of the entry dates.5 '
In 1984, the United States and Cuba negotiated the return to Cuba of
those persons who had arrived during Mariel and were ineligible to remain
in the United States.3" This agreement affected approximately 2700 Cubans
who had committed serious crimes in Cuba or the United Sates or those
6
psychiatric patients that Castro had forced to travel to the United States.1
The combination of Castro's political oppression, Cuba's failed
economic policies, and the beneficial treatment of the Cuban adjustment act
resulted in the settlement of over 750,000 Cubans into the United States
between 1959-1990.17
Since 1960 Cuba's economy has been heavily dependent on Soviet
aid.3 When the Eastern communist block collapsed in the early 1990s,
Cuba's primary source of income declined dramatically and this resulted in
scarcity of consumer goods and additional burdens on the Cuban people. 39
As internal discontent grew, the number of people risking their life in the
Florida Straits increased proportionally. 4 On July 13, 1994, a group of
people seeking to leave the island hijacked a ferryboat in Havana Harbor.4 1
The boat was sunk by the Cuban border patrol resulting in the death of
thirty-seven people.42 In the subsequent weeks three other passenger

33. Fair v. Meese, 643 F. Supp. 983 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
34. Id. at 988.
35. Matthew A. Pingeton, United States Immigration Policy: Detaining Cuban Refugees
Taken From the Sea, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. POL'Y 329, 330 (1999).
36. Id.
37. 1990 U.S. Census Bureau, reprinted in Silvia Pedraza, Cuba's Refugees: Manifold
Migrations, in 5 CUBA IN TRANSmON: ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE CUBAN
ECONOMY 311, 315 (1995).
38. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 8, at 67.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See generally Geoffrey W. Hymans, Outlawing the Use of Refugees as Tools in
Foreign Policy, 3 I.L.S.A. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 149, 152 (1996). The Cuban government
claimed that the sinking was an accident. However, survivors claimed that the boat was rammed
by water cannons from three government tugs and then rammed by one of the vessels.
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ferries were hijacked, as well as a plane and a military vessel.' 3 On August
5, 1994, rumors circulated in Havana that another ferry boat was going to
be hijacked to the United States. More than 500 people gathered on the
docks and the most serious anti-government riots occurred since Castro
took power."
Castro responded to the crisis by removing exit restrictions for those
seeking to flee to the United States by sea. In an article in PrensaLatina,"
Castro stated that "we will stop blocking the departure of those who want
to leave the country" and "we cannot continue to guard the coasts of the
United States.""
Cubans were now free to flee the country without the threat of
interdiction by Cuban patrol boats and without being subjected to the
"illegal exit" penalties of Cuban law. 7 This resulted in the immediate
departure of large numbers of migrants using home made rafts and taking
the perilous journey to the United States.
The Clinton administration responded to the crisis by reversing the
traditional policy of welcoming Cuban refugees to the United States. On
August 19, 1994, President William Clinton announced that the United
Sates would bar the "rafters" from entering the country. The United
States Coast Guard was instructed to detain the migrants at sea at transport
them to the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base as a precursor to repatriation."
The interdiction at sea of Cuban nationals in the high seas and" the
sudden reversal of the long held policy of protecting political refugees
created a politically volatile situation for the Clinton administration and
threatened to produce a defacto repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act.
By preventing Cubans from reaching United States territory, the
Clinton Administration prevented the first legal requirement of the CAA
from being met. The first requirement is that the applicant be "inspected
and admitted or paroled into the United States. "' Although the decision to

43. Id.
44. Id. at 153.
45. Presna Latina is Cuba's official news agency.
46. Hymans, supra note 42, at 153.
47. Cuba's penal code provides for a penalty for illegal departure. See U.S. Dept. of
State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice (Feb. 23, 2001) availab/e at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/751.htm.
48. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 8, at 67 (citing GAO, Cuba-U.S. Response to 1994 Cuban
Migration Crisis, GAO/NSIAD 9 5-211(Sept. 1995)).
49. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, supra note 4.
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prevent Cubans form entering the United States-° while fleeing
Communism was a new policy for the United States, detention of migrants
seeking to reach United States territory was not.
Executive Order 12,807, issued by President Bush in 1992 as a
response to the mass Haitian exodus of 1991,51 provided for the repatriation
of undocumented aliens without the benefit of immigration proceedings.
The order reads in part:
The president has the authority to suspend the entry of
aliens coming by sea to the United States without necessary
documentation, to establish reasonable rules and
regulations regarding, and other limitations on, the entry of
aliens into the United States, and to repatriate aliens
interdicted beyond the territorial seas of the United States. n
Executive Order 12,807 prompted legal challenges that were resolved
by the Supreme Court when it held that the repatriations of Haitians,
without first determining whether they qualified as refugees 53 , was not
prohibited by section 243 of the INA or article 33 of the United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.54
Although Executive Order 12,807 was not directed at Cubans fleeing
Communism, the order is not limited to specific nationality of aliens 5 and
therefore Cubans can be repatriated under its authority.
President's Clinton's decision to prevent Cubans fleeing Communism
from reaching the United States, and his reliance on President Bush's
Executive Order 12,807 were in contraposition to his own Executive Order
12,854,1 which implemented the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA).17 His

50. The United States does not include waters or airspace subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38).

51. For a helpful analysis of Exec. Order No. 12,807, see Summer L. Hacldey, Sea
Interdictions: Are Aliens Apprehended on the High Seas Entitled to ProtectionsAfforded by the
Immigration andNationality Act, 6 ILSA J. INTL. & COMP. L. 143 (1999).
52.

Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (June 1, 1992).

53. Refugee is "any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person has
habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well founded fear of

persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (West 2001).
54. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, (1993).
55. Hackley, supra note 51, at 149.
56. Exec. Order No. 12,854, 58 Fed. Reg. 36,587 (July 4, 1993).
57. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001 (West 2001).
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order ratified, approved and affirmed the Congressional findings and its
intent in passing the CDA. As it relates to the CDA Congress found that
[t]he government of Fidel Castro has demonstrated
consistent disregard for internationally accepted standards
of human rights and for democratic value. It restricts the
Cuban people's exercise of freedom of speech, press
assembly, and other rights recognized by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948.m
The adoption of the CDA into United States law also codified the
Congressional belief that fleeing persecution is legitimate methods of
opposing a dictatorship. In its relevant part the CDA states: "The Cuban
people have demonstrated their yearning for freedom and their increasing
opposition to the Castro government by risking their lives in organizing
independent democratic activities on the island and by undertaking
hazardous flights for freedom to the United States and other Countries." 19
During the rafter crisis of 1994, the United States government
appeared to have veered away for a policy of welcoming Cuban refugees to
one of preventing their entrance into United States jurisdiction therefore
preventing from becoming an "applicant for admission." The statutory
definition of an applicant for admission is "an alien present in the United
States or who has arrived in the United Sates."6 Cubans housed at
Guantanamo Naval base in Cuba were not given the benefit of the CAA
when the courts ruled that the naval base was not "United States
territory. "61
The rafter crisis ended when the United States and Cuba began
negotiations which would lead to an agreement on September 9, 1994
wherein the United States would Parole the Cubans detained in
Guantanamo and Cuba would accept the repatriation of Cubans picked up
at sea.6 2 The United States agreed to allow a minimum of 20,000 of
Cubans to migrate legally to United States each year but only if they
applied for immigrant or refugee visas at the United States Interest Section
in Havana.63 The refugees in Guantanamo were paroled" and the United
States policy of welcoming Cubans fleeing from the island ended.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(1) (West 2001).
Cuban Am. BarAss'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1424 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1418.
Id.
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President Bill Clinton ignored congressional intent and his ratification
of the Cuban Democracy Act5 when he defended his policies in a speech
on June 9, 1995 and declared:
We simply cannot admit all Cubans who seek to come
here. We cannot let people risk their lives on open seas in
unseaworthy rafts.

.

. Regularizing Cuba migration also

helps our efforts to promote a peaceful transition to
democracy on the island . . . For too long, Castro has

used the threats of uncontrolled migration to distract us
from this fundamental objective. With the steps we've
taken, we will be able to devote ourselves fully to our real
long term goals."
IV. ENFORCEMENT OR CIRCUMVENTION OF THE CUBAN
ADJUSTMENT ACT?

The U.S.-Cuba migration accords created an apparent disparity
between those who are interdicted at sea and almost certainly returned to
Cuba, and those who manage to reach dry land. The race for the shore has
become the prerequisite to receiving the benefits of the Cuban Adjustment
Act. For Cubans, a United States vessel in international waters is not
jusridictionally sufficient, and a safe refuge under United States control
does not suffice to trigger the "arrived in" the United Sates requirement of
section 235 of the INA.6

Cuban refugees are therefore required to avoid detection and to the
head for United States shores. Even those who are apprehended in United
States territorial waters still face deportation to Cuba. Courts have held
that under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, merely crossing
into the territorial waters of the United States is insufficient to constitute
physical presence for the purpose of determining whether an alien has
entered the United States. The "physical presence" requirement of the
entry test can be satisfied only when an alien reaches dry land."1 Even
64. "The Attorney General may ....
in his discretion parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe... for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit any alien applying for admission into the United States . . . " 8
U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (West 2001)
65. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6001 (West 2001).
66. Travieso-Diaz, supra note 8, at 69, citing President William Clinton, Speech directed
to Cuban-Americans, in ASSOCIATED PRESS June 27, 1995.
67. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
68. Yang v. Maugans68 F.3d 1540, 1549 (3d Cir. 1995).
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when the alien has disembarked and is heading to shore, the courts have
held that a person is not "physically present" in the United States. This
position was upheld when Chinese migrants aboard the vessel Golden
Venture jumped into the water and waded through the surf before being
detained. 69 The court held that
United States immigration law is designed to regulate the
travel of human beings, whose habitat is land, not the
comings and goings of fish or birds. We hold that an alien
attempting to enter the United States by sea has not
satisfied the physical presence element of Pierre at least
until he has landed.70
In 1999 a group of Cubans migrants tested the policy when they
landed in Key Largo, Florida, and stood in water three feet deep: two
7
were apprehended one hundred yards from shore and one made it ashore. 1
Although their feet were on the same ground, only the one who came
ashore was allowed to stay." An INS spokesman defended the policy
stating "There are unique circumstances around every landing. The strict
interpretation of the wet-foot policy is that the other alien was still in the
water. The interpretation found that one had made landfall. Everybody
knows you have to make landfall.""
Has the wet-foot dry-foot policy deterred Cubans from leaving the
island? The answer appears to be no. Just 1,400 Cuban migrants were
intercepted at sea from 1995 to 1997.74
The number of Cubans who reached United States shore totaled 2,048
in 1999-more than double 1998 total of 916.7 An estimated eighty
percent were believed to have been smuggled by professional smugglers
who charge between $1000 and $5000 a head for the trip. 7'

69. The Golden Venture was a merchant ship which left China on February 13, 1993 and
transported Chinese migrants to the United States. The vessel ran aground on the morning of
June 6, 1993, in New York.

70. 27ang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 754 (2d Cir. 1995).
71.

Yves Colon, Touching Land Defines Who Stays, Goes, MIA. HERALD, Jun. 30, 1999.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.

74. Jay Weaver, U.S. Migration Policy Doesn't Deter Treache Journeys, Cuban
Smuggling on Rise, MIA. HERALD, Dec. 12, 1999.
75.

Id.

76. Id.
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V.

INS INTERPRETATION OF THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND

IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY OF 1996 (IIRIRA).

In effort to control illegal immigration Congress passed the Illegal
Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)." The
Act created confusion among the various districts as to what constitutes
"admission," "inspection," and "parole," and whether Cubans entering
through irregular means could be paroled and eventually adjust under the
CAA,.78 The INS determined that Cubans who arrived at a port other than
a designated port of entry could no longer adjust to permanent resident
status under the CAA.7 9 Immigration advocates considered that the INS
interpretation of IIRIRA resulted in de facto repeal of the Cuban
Adjustment Act.'8 Community activists feared that if Cubans could not
adjust their status and were "deported," this would create a subclass of
undocumented aliens who would be unable to earn a living and would
linger indefinitely in immigration limbo. 8'
This confusion led INS Commissioner Dorris Meissner to issue a
memorandum clarifying the legibility for permanent residence under the
Cuban adjustment act.f The memorandum specifically addressed the issue
of Cubans arriving by sea. In its relevant parts it reads:
This policy clarification, effective immediately, helps
define in specific terms those Cubans who are eligible for
parole and adjustment of status under the Cuban
Adjustment Act, regardless of how they arrived in the
United States. Under the CAA, a Cuban national who is
paroled may, one year after the grant of parole, apply for
permanent residence in the United States. The fact that a
Cuban national arrived in the United States at a place other
than a designated port of entry will not make him or her

77. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
78. "Irregular means" refers those aliens who enter by sea without going through a port of
entry. Cuban rafters who entered without being found did not enter through a "port of entry" a
port of entry includes airports, seaports and land ports located at the border.
79. Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, supra note 4.
80. Dominguez, supra note 7.
81. Although immigration could remove a Cuban national under I.N.A § 235, the
government of Cuba generally does not accept the repatriation of Cubans from U.S. soil. See
Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, supra note 4.
82. Press Release, U.S. Department. of Justice, Clarification of Eligibility for Permanent
Residence Under the Cuban Adjustment Act (April 26, 1999) available at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/cubarel.htm (ast visited Feb. 3, 2002).
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ineligible for permanent residence under the CAA (unless
the individual is ineligible on other grounds such as having
a criminal record). This action removes a significant bar if
the Cubans are otherwise eligible for adjustment under the
CAA. A Cuban national who is in the United States
without having been admitted or paroled by the INS must
first surrender into INS custody and receive a grant of
parole and wait one year before applying for permanent
residence under the CAA. With the grant of parole, the
Cuban national will be able to apply for employment
authorization. 83
Doris Meissner's memorandum and clarification led immigration
advocates to declare that the CAA had "survive another blow."84 Before
the dust settled, the INS threw another roadblock to the implementation of
Cuban Adjustment Act. It began to classify Cubans arriving at United
States airports "arriving aliens."
Traditionally Cubans arriving through United States airports were
placed in exclusion proceedings and the INS adjusted their status even after
receiving final exclusion orders.u Subsequent to the passage of IIRIRA,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) took the position that
immigration judges lacked the authority to adjudicate the application for
adjustment filed by arriving alienss, in removal proceedings. Attorneys for
Cubans migrants argued that Cubans cannot be "arriving aliens" under the
INA."7
They argued that by statutory definition an "applicant for admission"
is an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
has arrived in the United States." They further argued that applicants for
admission are subject to inspection and screening by INS, and officers

83. Id.
84. Dominguez, supra note 7.
85. Exclusion orders were given pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (2001) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.
86. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q) (2002). The term arriving alien means an applicant for admission
coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port of entry, or an alien seeking transit
through the United States at a port of entry, or an alien interdicted in international waters or
United States waters and brought into the Untied States by any means, whether or not to
designated port of entry, and regardless of the means of transport. An arriving alien remains
such even if paroled pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the act.
87. Brief for Appellee/Respondent Artigas, at 9, in In re Artigas, (U.S. Dep't of Justice
Board of Immigration Appeals) (Case No. A 76 543 602).
88. Id. at 10, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225(a)(1) (West 2001).
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shall order the applicant removed unless the alien is a native or citizen of
Cuba and said Cuban arrives by aircraft at a port of entry. 89
Respondents' attorneys argued that because all applicants for
admission except for Cubans who arrive by aircraft at a port of entry, if
not admissible, must be "expeditiously" removed and Cubans cannot be
removed expeditiously, Cubans cannot fall under the INA's definition of
arriving alien.10
The issue of whether an immigration judge has jurisdiction to
adjudicate an application for adjustment of status under the Cuban
adjustment act when the applicant is an arriving alien in removal
proceedings was decided by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in In
re Ada Rosa Artigas." In Artigas, the court held that an immigration judge
has jurisdiction to adjudicate an application for adjustment of status under
the Cuban refugee Adjustment Act of 1966.
In the 35 years since the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act, the
law has withstood a series of legal challenges. Pro-immigration advocates
wonder why there is such a resistance to an act that benefits people a
repressive dictatorship.93 The answer appears to point to the political and
ideological battles which have plagued the CAA since its inception.
VI. THE POLITICAL BATTLE OVER THE STATUTE
A. The Cuban Government's Effort to Repeal the "KillerLaw"
If there was ever any doubt as to Cuba's position regarding the Cuban
Adjustment act it was dispelled by Cuban president Fidel Castro's speech
on March 8, 2000. Castro's key remarks included:
The United States does not have any right to promote the
death of people form this country, whether they are
criminals or not. The diabolical killing machine that
claims lives and provokes tragedies is nothing other than
the Cuban Adjustment Act. We will fight against this
vicious law, this heinous and criminal law. We will keep
fighting until it is repealed. Only then can we be certain
that thousands of innocent children will not be illegally
uprooted from their homeland, from their schools, from
89. Brief for Appellee/Respondent Artigas, supra note 87, at 9; 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(1)(i)

(2001).
90. Brief for Appellee/Respondent Artigas, supra note 87, at 9.
91. In re Ada Rosa Artigas, 23 1. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 2001).
92. Id.
93. Dominguez, supra note 7.
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their identities, and subjected to extreme dangers or even
death.9'
On July 2, 2000 Ricardo Alarcon continued the verbal assault of the
CAA in a television interview with Sam Donaldson.9 ' When asked by Mr.
Donaldson& why he referred to the Cuban Adjustment Act as a "killing
machine", Mr. Alarcon responded that the Cuban Adjustment act is a way
to "distort reality" and that since the United States is not prepared to have
a "Dominican, Mexican, Haitian or a Chinese adjustment act and it's just
for Cuba. It's precisely Cold war politics. "9
Cuba's public repudiation of the CAA intensified when on July 12,
2000, the government of Cuba issued the "Proclamation by National
Assembly of the People's power of the Republic of Cuba on the Cuban
Adjustment Act."9
The proclamation referred to the CAA as "the
criminal, immoral and discriminatory immigration policy, deliberately
conceived to destabilize and undermine Cuban society while shamefully
manipulating the tragedies caused by this act."" The Cuban government
accused the United States of using the CAA to criminally incite Cubans to
risk their lives in dangerous sea crossing for the sole purpose of
embarrassing the Cuban government. 100 The proclamation called for the
United States to "put an end to its criminal, irresponsible and demagogic
policy, conceived and implemented against the Cubans, which is
detrimental to other Latin Americans and harmful to the interests of the
American people. "19
B. Opposition within the United States
The Cuban Adjustment Act has come under fire not only from the
government of Cuba, but from political groups within the United States.
The question has been asked: Why is it that United States Law reflects

94. Castro Ruz, supra note 6.
95. Mr. Alarcon is the president of the National Assembly of the People's Power of the
Republic of Cuba.
96. Sam Donaldson is a U.S television reporter host of the program "This Week."
97. Interview by Sam Donaldson with Ricardo Alarcon, President of the Cuban National
Assembly, This Week, ABC News (Jul. 2, 2000).
98. Proclamationby the NationalAssembly of People's Power of the Republic of Cuba on
the Cuban Adjustment Act, Digital Granma International, Jul. 12, 2000, at
http:llwww.granma.cu/documento/inglesOO/026-i.html (ast visited Feb. 3, 2002).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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favoritism for Cubans?1in The Federation for American Immigration
Reform (FAIR) contends that the CAA provides disparate treatment under
immigration law between Cuban and other groups."'n FAIR has called the
CAA "the most massively used exceptional provision in our law" and has
publicly called for its repeal.0'
In 1996 Congress debated the repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act.105
Senator Bob Graham sought to condition the repeal of the CAA on a
democratically elected government being in power in Cuba.in6 Those
favoring the Graham amendment argued that repeal of the Act was entirely
unjustified because Castro continues to be a brutal dictator who
"suppresses all democratic and individual freedoms, and thousands of
Cubans still risk their lives by trying to escape to America. "'°0
Those opposing the amendment contended that the CAA is an
anachronism.'
While they agreed that Castro is "a ruthless communist
dictator" they noted that China, North Korea, and Vietnam are also ruled
by ruthless communist dictators and the United States does not give special
treatment to those fleeing form those nations. 'n Those opposing the
Graham amendment synthesized the belief of those who oppose the CAA
when they stated in part:
It would be nice if the United States were able to afford to
take in all the billions of people around the world who live
under totalitarian rule, but it obviously cannot.
We
already have millions of people form around the world
who have been cleared for legal entry into the United
States, may of whom are the spouses or very young
children of citizens, but will have to wait for years before
their turn to enter comes up. Given this fact, we cannot
support a continuation of the Cuba Adjustment Act before
its application to the 20,000 parolees who will be let in
102. Issue Brief, FavortisM for
uans, FEDERATION FOR AMER. IMMIG. REFORM, Jul.
1998, available at http://www.fairus.org/html/04154806.htm [hereinafter FAIR Brief].
103. FAIR argues that Haitians who arrive under similar circumstances as Cubans do not
receive the same treatment under that law. See FAIR Brief, supra note 102.
104. FAIR Brief, supra note 102, at 4.
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each year. Therefore we urge the rejection of the Graham
Amendment.n °

The Graham amendment passed 62 to 37, and the repeal of the Cuban
Adjustment Act was averted.'"
The attacks on the Cubans Adjustment Act have gone beyond the legal
and the political arena and have entered the realm of legal academia.
Some in academia have argued that the social ills that are caused by the
CAA are "too great for the CAA's roots to remain unexamined."1 1 2 The
authors of the Harvard note have put forth the notion that the justifications
which created the CAA are outdated and that the CAA has inflicted "great
harm on American Society.""' They argue that the CAA has been accused
of being a racist policy, which in turn has tarnished the legitimacy of
United States immigration policy, fostering social apathy, dissatisfaction
and resentment in immigrant communities.14
Furthermore, critics argue that in addition to fostering internal
discontent the CAA has benefited Castro because the it "has been
simultaneously a sword that cuts deep lines of division and resentment in
the United States and shields and protects the island by enabling him to
export undesirables and unify all Cubans."'Ii
VII. CONCLUSION
The Cuban Adjustment Act is the byproduct of an era when United
States Immigration Policy was a testament of the ideals and values of the
United States. In 1966, The United States government thought that the
ideal of protecting those fleeing communism in the island of Cuba was
worthy of special legislation. The legislative history suggests, and the
statutory language indicates, that the intent and purpose of the Cuban
Adjustment Act is to facilitate the integration of those fleeing Cuba into
American society by granting them the right to become permanent United
States residents. Congress has ratified its intent in subsequent years and
the courts have validated the legality of the statute by upholding the right
of Cubans in the United States to adjust their status using the CAA.
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114. Id. at 916.
115. Id.at 917.

724 /LSA Journal of International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 8:707
Those who oppose the CAA argue that its initial purpose is no longer
valid, and that it gives Cubans and unfair advantage. However, Cubans
continue to flee Cuba, and the Cuban government continues to violate
human rights and other immigrant groups do not benefit by the repeal of
the Cuban Adjustment Act.
Academics have wondered whether Americans will see the CAA
through an idealistic lens or a realistic one."6 Human rights activists have
asked why there is such resistance to an act that benefits victims of
oppression. The CAA has been perpetually interwoven with politics and
foreign policy and it will continue to be so. The CAA might be the law of
the land, but it has been, and continues to be, a law under siege.

116. Id. at 924.

